CONSTITUTION — GatewayQR-MunicVAllende
Inviolable rules. No ADR or SPEC may contradict them; a breach is a BLOCKER finding.
- C1 — Amounts to the cent. Stored as
DECIMAL(12,2), neverfloat/double. The amount sent to the municipal API is exactly the POStotalitem. (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16) - C2 — The API key never leaves the gateway. Encrypted at rest, never logged (the wire log
masks
X-Api-Key), never sent in clear to the POS or the cockpit. (CWE-532, CWE-312) (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16) - C3 — The payer's employee number (
pagadoPorLegajo) is never written to logs. Database only (DOMAIN-MODEL D3, Ley 25.326). (CWE-532) (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16) - C4 — Never a second municipal charge for the same
trxid, including retries and gateway restarts (reworded 2026-11-16: the ticket number is not unique, DOMAIN-MODEL D1). (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16) - C5 — Never report a denial while the outcome is uncertain. While uncertain, the gateway
answers
PAGO_ENVIADO, neverREFUND_DENEGADO. The bound is the POS's ownTIMEOUT_RX, which ends in "Reintenta via Consulta?". If the cashier gives up, the gateway keeps querying in the background: if the charge turns out PAID, the attempt becomes PAID_UNCONFIRMED and raises a cockpit alert; if it turns out VENCIDO, it closes as EXPIRED with no alert. (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16) - C6 — Never cross environments. A sandbox key is never used against the production URL, or the reverse. The environment is checked per merchant before every call. (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16)
- C7 — Events are append-only. An attempt's event is never deleted or edited. (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16)
- C8 — No default cockpit credentials. Login with BCrypt-hashed passwords, inherited from GatewayPrismaQR. (CWE-798) (origin: agent, confirmed: 2026-11-16)